Anand MOHEEPUTH
Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister (1957-1963), retired for some minutes in the smoking room in the House of Commons when an idea crossed his mind. Did the holding of overseas possessions make sense in today’s context buffeted by global changes?
He called the Secretary of state for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, instructing him to work out a ‘Profit and Loss’ account of each colony and the benefits that accrued from each one of them.
When the grim analyses were submitted to him by the Colonial Policy Committee, Macmillan seemed shocked and screamed – “Give them their independence…” The British Empire was, he said, an albatross and a fiscal burden….”. He reacted in the same manner as would do a person having a business flair. No matter how hard it was to sacrifice past prestige and glory. In that case, the British Empire was the sacrificial lamb.
Macmillan belonged to a well-known business family in the field of printing and publication. The British taxpayers, depressed by an economic strain, according to him, could no longer continue subsidising lame ducks to maintain them only for the sake of prestige.
Nicknamed ‘Supermac’, Macmillan, was reputed for taking tough decisions based on his convictions that to many appeared unpalatable. In what came to be known as the “Night of long Knives”, he sacked a third of his cabinet that included senior ministers when some instigated by Rab Butler were in a revolt mood. A reshufflement of the government with some heads going to roll was leaked and embarrassed the Prime Minister.
Britain was then in a terrible social and economic turmoil. A failing economy and social explosion as a consequence of the world war loomed large. The unpleasant mood in the country was reflected by the 1945 general election which saw even its wartime hero Churchill, biting the dust.
The overall pessimism that shrouded Britain was further accentuated by the changes in the world’s political landscape. These undesirable factors were therefore critical and decisive in the movement towards decolonization that swept in the 1950s and 1960s. Not only Britain, but France also bore the brunt of the decolonisation era when it was forced into giving Algeria its independence in 1962.
Thus, in an atmosphere vitiated by uncertainty, Macmillan had the guts to react swiftly. He embarked on a tour of Africa in early 1960s to announce with drumbeats the “Wind of Change” that was about to blow across Africa. What it clearly meant was that a decolonisation plan was set up to free British territories found in Africa. The decolonisation plan was viewed as a new approach towards colonial matters though the Conservative Imperialists in the Commons were highly critical of Macmillan’s plan.
The announcement of this “Wind of Change” unleashed a frenzy as African political leaders rushed to the Colonial office to fix dates for their countries’ independence.
Writing in the Spectator magazine in January 1964, Iain Macleod, former Secretary of state for Colonies, wrote : “regardless of whether the countries were fully ready or not, there was a deliberate speeding up of the movement towards independence”. Were the countries ready for independence? In Macleod’s opinion, “Of course, not….”
But Macmillan was convincing when he said the African people in his “Wind of Change” speech that “the march of men towards their freedom cab guided but not halted…’
“Whether we like it or not”, the Prime Minister stated, “the growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact and our national policies must take account of it…”.
The feverish rush for the claim of independence was such that during the prime ministership of Macmillan between 1957 and 1963, according to Philip E.Hemming, in “Macmillan and the end of the British empire” , fifteen colonies out of nineteen in Africa were granted independence.
Leave alone the acute internal problems Britain had to grapple with, at international level, it had to cope with the changing global landscape in which insecurity was a key element for consideration.
The Suez crisis (1956), for instance, exposed Britain’s weakness in dealing with international affairs. In its confrontation with Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser over the control of the Suez Canal despite France’s support, Britain failed miserably to subdue the Egyptian President to the point that its Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, had no other choice than to resign.
The Suez crisis disturbed the hitherto tranquil environment. It encouraged the emergence of a pan-Arab nationalism symbolized by Nasser’s courageous riposte. But it also saw the start of Cold War politics involving the US and the Soviet Union which sided with most of the Middle East countries. Thus, the imperial influence and prestige once Britain wielded in the Middle East declined, leaving the US to fight a proxy war. While the US dictated its terms, Britain was content with playing second fiddle.
Indian Ocean was a major preoccupation for both the US and Britain as Soviet influence threatened to engulf the region. Hence, a US connivance to free remaining British territories. The fear of Communist expansion was one of the elements that prompted the detachment of Diego Garcia already in negotiation with the British in 1963. When Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1965, in an arm-twisting exercise, bullied Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam with a threat “either the Premier and his colleagues could return to Mauritius with independence or without it”, Ramgoolam replied, “It is a matter of detail…”. The die was cast.
When Iain Macleod came to Mauritius in February 1960 to brief the Governor and the local political leaders about the decolonization agenda and that constitutional developments for Mauritius were scheduled in the months ahead, Observers could anticipate independence was in the pipeline. Patrick Gordon-Walker, a noted British Labour MP writing in 1961 in Advance, signaled the imminent award of independence in due course.
In accordance with processes to be followed in the decolonisation system to culminate in the award of independence, Mauritius had simply to demand independence by passing a resolution voted by a single majority in the Council formed after the general election of 1967.
Yet, there is a mistaken understanding in Mauritius that the outcome of the 1967 general election was decisive in the conclusion towards independence. The theme of independence and association was peddled as a political stunt for electoral campaign. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam was clever to choose to be on the right side of history for a cause already won, while the PMSD in proposing association as against independence was banking on a lame horse which didn’t even feature as an option on the decolonisation programme.
The concept of association was ruled out already as far back as 1955 when Dom Mintoff, leader of the Malta Labour Party proposed an association with Britain. By the way, inspired by this Maltese proposal, Dr Ramgoolam showed interest for a similar formula with Britain but the British rejected wholesomely the Maltese’ proposal. After the Malta failure, SSR renounced the idea of association and then jumped in the bandwagon of the British becoming a staunch militant for independence.
Regardless of the outcome of the 1967 general election, independence was inevitable. Anthony Greenwood, the new Secretary of state for Colonies, already in 1965, declared, “to grant independence would be in accordance with British Policy and Practice and that independence was a goal which Britain herself should encourage her independent territories to attain….”
That independence was granted after the struggles put up by our political leaders is a fallacious notion that needs to be dispelled. Mauritius was not engaged in a war path with Britain to claim independence. It was generously offered to us as a “gift” (Sookdeo Bissoondoyal dixit) in the context of a massive decolonisation exercise. The British were as much keen to go for a decolonisation spree to ensure their own freedom and survival from complicated colonial hurdles as Macmillan mentioned earlier.
